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COLLEGIATE PROGRAM SAFETY CULTURE SURVEY – A COMPARISON OF
DISCIPLINES
Wendy Beckman, Daniel Siao, Carlos Smith, Kevin Corns
Middle Tennessee State University
Murfreesboro, Tennessee
The use of safety culture surveys to determine constituent perception of an 
organization’s efforts toward safety is widely accepted. However, the use of such 
surveys to compare disciplines within a collegiate aviation department has
infrequently been employed. Students enrolled in flight, maintenance, and UAS
programs participated in a safety culture survey, providing data on the safety
culture within each program as well as the ability to compare programs. Subscales
for safety values, safety fundamentals, and risk assessment were included. There 
were statistically significant differences in safety values between the maintenance 
group and both the flight and UAS groups, and between all three groups in safety
fundamentals, but no statistically significant difference between programs in risk
assessment.
In an effort to understand areas of strength and weakness, an inaugural safety culture
survey was conducted of students in the flight, maintenance, and unmanned aircraft systems
operations (UAS) programs of a collegiate aviation department. In addition to establishing a
baseline perception of safety culture, differences between the responses of the students in the
different programs were examined. While there have been previous studies comparing functional
areas within companies, there has been little work examining differences between functional
areas in an academic environment. Although all three programs are located within the same 
department, sub-culture development was felt to be likely, impacting student perceptions of 
safety culture. 
Literature Review
Several studies (Clarke, 2006; McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000; Varonen &
Mattila, 2000) have confirmed the relationship between the employee perception of safety
culture and the level of safety actually experienced within an organization. Thus, safety culture
surveys serve as tools to direct efforts toward continuous improvement. There is now a 
significant body of research on safety culture in aviation; a 2011 study reviewed 23 safety
culture surveys which had been utilized in military and commercial aviation organizations
(O’Connor, O’Dea, Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011). Although early studies tended to focus on a
particular area of operations (i.e., flight, maintenance, cabin crew), several have concentrated on 
the variations found between operations within an organization. Patankar (2003) found 
significant differences between flight operations and maintenance personnel at a US company. 
Gao et al. (2015) found that while the overall safety climate across four groups (flight crew,
cabin crew, mechanics, and ground operations staff) was positive, there were also significant 
differences between occupational groups.
As collegiate aviation programs embrace safety management system (SMS) concepts, 






      
  
   
  
          
   
   
     
         
      
 
            
       
 
 
   
     
   
   
     
    
 
        
         
    
        
   








   
            
       
   
   
 
In the largest study of safety culture at collegiate flight schools to date (Robertson, 2017), the
Collegiate Aviation Program Safety Culture Survey (CAPSCUS) was completed by students and 
employees at 13 collegiate flight schools across the US. This study found a correlation between 
positive safety culture survey results and the degree of SMS implementation, level of safety
promotion, and management commitment to safety at the collegiate level. Based on these
findings, Robertson argued for the value of using safety culture surveys as both a baseline
measure and as an ongoing indication of the effectiveness of a collegiate institution’s SMS
implementation efforts. There has been considerably less work done in areas outside flight
training at the collegiate level. However, a 2016 study (Adjekum et al.) looked at aviation
management, air traffic control, and UAS students’ perception of safety culture. The study found 
that non-flight majors have “different areas of emphasis” (Adjekum, et al, 2016, p. 17) within the
safety culture than do flight majors within the same department. It is this difference between
programs that is of particular interest in this study.
Methodology 
There have been numerous versions of safety culture surveys utilized over the past 15 
years. These in large part have been developed from previously existing surveys, to meet the
needs of the organization conducting the survey. This study is no exception to that precedent, 
with most survey questions based on the previously used CAPSCUS collegiate safety culture 
study (Adjekum, 2013; Robertson, 2017). The survey consisted of a series of Likert-type scale 
questions, divided into subscales of departmental safety values, safety fundamentals, and risk 
assessment of both participants themselves and their view of others. Note, three separate surveys
were distributed, reflecting the appropriate program terminology (i.e., flight, maintenance, or
UAS) although the questions displayed in Table 1 use generic phraseology. As a human subject
research project, permission to conduct this survey was granted by the university’s Institutional
Review Board. In the spring 2018 semester, all students in the programs of interest received an e-
mail from the department chair, requesting that they participate in the safety culture survey and 
providing a link to the electronic survey. Three days after the initial e-mail a follow up e-mail 
was sent, and four days later, the survey was closed. The survey was conducted anonymously, 
with no identifying information recorded. 
Results
The 507 students enrolled in the flight, maintenance, or UAS operations program in the
spring 2018 semester were the population for this study. The flight program had 370 students, 
maintenance had 81 students, and UAS had 56 students. A total of 188 responses were collected,
representing 37% of the total population of students in the three programs of interest. There were 
127 (67.5%) respondents enrolled in the flight program, 37 (19.7%) in the maintenance program, 
and 24 (12.8%) in the UAS program. The disparity in sample sizes is due to the imbalance in the
number of students enrolled in each program. For instance, the flight program is the largest in the
department, exceeding other concentrations by around 300 students. However, when the number
of respondents in each program is compared to the population of each program, the response
rates were 34% for flight students, 46% for maintenance students, and 43% for UAS students. 













    
  




            
stro11J!lV dis«Rree (1), disaJ!ree (2), neutral (3), aJ!ree (4) and stronRIV aJ!ree (5) Flight ~laint. UAS 
SAFETY VAL UES !-.,lean (SD) Mean(SD) Mean(SD) 
1. Safety is a core value of the Aerospace Department. 4.57 ( .89) 4.00 (.97) 4 .71 (.69) 
2. The Aerospace Deprutment is more concemed about making monev than being safe. (Reverse1) 3 82 (.98) 4.06 (.86) 4 .08 (1.0) 
3. The Aerospace D eprutment does not show much concem for safety until there is an accident or 4 .25 ( .70) 3.97 ( .88) 4 .29 (.86) 
incident. (Reverse1) 
4. The Aerospace Depaitment does not cut comers where safety is concerned. 4 14 ( 1.0) 3.59 ( .98) 4.25 (.99) 
5. The Aerospace Depaitment goes above and beyond regulatory minimums when it comes to 4.19 ( .82) 3.54 (LO) 4.52 (.73) 
issues of safety. 
6. The Aerospace Depaitment tries to get ai·ound safety requirements whenever the chance presents 4.17 ( .90) 4.08 ( .76) 4.17 (.94) 
itself. ffieverse1) 
7. Aerospace Department senior personnel view regulation violations ve1y seriously, even when 4.27 ( .78) 3.68 (1.1) 4 .33 (.96) 
thev do not result in anv serious damage or iniurv 
SAFETY FlJ"NDA,'\-IEN TALS 
8. Checklists and procedures are easy to understand. 4.36 ( .71) 3.54 ( 1.2) 4 .21 (.98) 
9. The safety practices and procedures manual is cru·efullv kept up to date. 4.21 (.66) 3.35 (1.3) 4.18 (.73) 
10. The Aerospace D epartment is willing to invest money, resources, and effo1t to improve safety. 3.89 ( .87) 3.75 (1.1) 4.42 (.83) 
11. The Aerosoace D eoartment is committed to eauiooing aircraft with uo-to-date technol011v. 3 .91 (94) NA NA 
12. Instructors have a clear understanding of risks associated with specific operations. 4 .29 ( .70) 4.27 (.69) 4 .87 (.34) 
13. Safety is consistently emphasized during training. 4.41 ( .65) 3.81 ( .91) 4.78 (.42) 
14. Instructors teach shortcuts and wavs to get around safety reauirements. (Reverse1) 4.00 C.81) 3.97 (1.0) 4.45 ( .91) 
15. The Aerospace D epartment ensures that maintenance on aircraft is adeQuatelv perfo1med. 4.00 ( .88) NA NA 
16. The Aerospace D eoartment ensures that aircraft are safe to overate. 4.17 (.73) NA NA 
17. The Aerospace D epartment safety repo1ting svstem is convenient and easv to use. 4 .20 ( .75) 3.97 (1.1) 4 .26 (.92) 
18. Students are actiivelv involved in identifving and resolving safety concerns. 4.00 (.82) 3.38 (1.2) 4.43 (.95) 
19. Safety is consistently emphasized in all stages of practical training. 4.41 ( .65) 3.81 ( .91) 4.78 (.42) 
Risk Assessment of SELF (students asked to rate frequency they experienced the following):2 
Scale: never (J), once in. the last six momhs (2), two to four times in the la.st sLY. months (3), a11d 
five or more times in the last six mo11ths (4). 
20. Reported for a flight lesson when fatigued, ill, or under unusual stress because you felt you had 1.48 ( .82) NA NA 
no other choice? 
21. Were pressured to conduct a flight (or lab) in what you believed to be unsafe weather or 1.17 ( .42) 1.05 ( .33) 1 04 (.21) 
environmental conditions? 
22. Were pressured to fly an aircraft you believed was in an unsafe mechanical condition (flight); 1.24 ( .63) 1.17(56) 1.00 (.OO) 
unsafe eauioment rMaint. UAS)? 
23. Failed to challenge more senior personnel (instrnctor or management personnel) on a safety 1.07 ( .26) 1.11 ( .39) 1 04 (.21) 
issue for fear of being penalized in some maimer? 
24. Made a hard landing that you did not repo1t ? 1.24 ( .56) NA NA 
25. Were aware of a safety issue but did not file a safety repo1t ? 1.26 ( .48) 138 (.79) 1 09 (.29) 
26. Were aware of another student acting in an unsafe mrumer but you did not file a safety report? 1.43 ( .56) 128 (.83) 1.22 (.52) 
27. Allowed an instructor or senior pilot's error to go unchallenged? 1.14 (.35) NA NA 
Note: 1: "Reverse" indicates the question was worded in the negative to check and coll'ect for student inattention to questions. 
Results indicated have been reversed to the positive so sub-scale statistics could be calculated. 2: The risk assessment questions 
were also asked as an assessment of "others" but are not repeated here due to space constraints. 
(23.4%) juniors, 39 (20.7%) seniors, and 1 (< 1%) graduate student. The means and standard
deviations for each question, by program, can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1
Survey Questions and Descriptive Statistics
Statistical Analysis for Research Question 1
Are students’ perceptions of the safety value, safety fundamentals, and risk assessment
scales consistent with their view of “safety is a core value”?
It was our objective to determine if the perception of safety was consistent across all
scales. To accomplish this analysis, an ANOVA was conducted on the mean scores for each 






          
          
          
 
 
     
             
   
    
 
 
    
        
 
           
          
   
         
          
         
  
         
   
       
         
 
          
      
       
            
   
      
      
     
          
     




       
            
             
         
ability to use summated scores. The scores for “safety is a core value of the Aerospace 
Department” were not combined with any other scales and was analyzed independently. The data 
met the assumption of normality, but the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not met. 
The result of the Levene’s test was F(4) = 15.09, p < 0.05. Welch’s ANOVA was applied to the 
data to adjust for differences in group variances, as this test is not sensitive to unequal variances
(Jan & Shieh, 2014). The result of Welch’s ANOVA was statistically significant, Welch’s F(4, 
441.91) = 41.59, p < 0.05. A Tukey post-hoc test showed statistically significant differences (p < 
.05) among all scales when compared to the perception of safety as a core value (M = 4.48, SD = 
.91). The mean for the safety value scale was 3.71 (SD = .48), the mean for the safety
fundamental scale was 3.93 (SD = .51), and the mean for the risk assessment scale was 4.06 (SD
= .26).
Statistical Analysis for Research Question 2
Are there statistically significant differences in the perceptions of safety among students
in different programs? 
Our second objective was to determine any statistically significant differences in the
perception of safety as a core value among the three programs selected for this study. The data 
met the assumption of normality and the assumption of equal variances. A one-way ANOVA 
was performed on the data, and the result was statistically significant: F(2, 185) = 7.01, p < .05. 
A post hoc analysis using the Tukey HSD test revealed that the mean for the flight group (M = 
4.57, SD = .89) was statistically different than the mean for the maintenance group (M = 4.0, SD
= .97). However, the difference between the flight and UAS groups was not statistically
significant (M = 4.71, SD = .69). Additionally, there were statistically significant differences
between the maintenance group and both the flight and UAS groups. Furthermore, the
differences among the concentrations on the three other scales were tested. The result of the
ANOVA for the safety value scale was statistically significant: F(2, 184) = 5.49, p < .05. The
results of the post hoc analysis using the Tukey HSD test was similar to the previous result of
safety as a core value, indicating that the mean of the maintenance group (M = 3.82, SD = .67)
was statistically different than the means of both the flight group (M = 4.13, SD = .54) and the
UAS group (M = 4.28, SD = .72). Similarly, there was no statistical difference between the UAS
group and the flight group. For the safety fundamentals scale, the result of the ANOVA was also
significant: Welch’s F(2, 49.6) = 11.61, p < .05. However, the Tukey HSD post hoc test revealed 
statistically significant differences between all groups with the mean of the maintenance group as
the lowest (M = 3.76, SD = .70), the UAS group with the highest (M = 4.48, SD = .45), with the
flight group in the middle (M = 4.18, SD = .48). Finally, the risk assessment scale differed from
the previous results in that no statistically significant differences were found among the three 
groups, F(2, 182) = 1.97, p = .143. The means for the groups are as follows: maintenance (M = 
4.77, SD = .40), flight (M = 4.80, SD = .29), and UAS (M = 4.92, SD = .13).
Discussion
Overall, students in all programs of the department had a favorable perception of safety
as a core value; however, their perceptions of aspects of safety across the other scales were 
lower. If safety is a core value of an organization, it should be reflected in all aspects of






           
      
  
     
  
 
    
         
             
  
 
          
       
       
 
        
    
      
     




    
           
    
         
       
 
         
    
        
        
   
    
          
         
       
       
    
 
    
 
   
        
results also suggest that there is a disconnect between perceiving safety as a core value and
understanding safety programs. Safety as a core value should be supported in practice. Two
possible explanation for this disparity are posited. First, students may not have a fully developed 
understanding of SMS. They believe safety is a core value, but fail to make a logical connection 
to what they see in practice. Second, emphasis of safety through verbal and written 
communications to students may lead to higher perceptions of safety as a core value. 
Additionally, among the three groups, maintenance had the least favorable perception of
safety as a core value with statistically significant differences between maintenance and the other
two groups. This is also true for the safety value and safety fundamentals scales. It is expected
that students within the same department, under the same oversight, and operating with similar
safety policies and requirements should have similar perceptions of safety, but this is not the
case. Sub-cultures may explain the differences in perceptions of safety, as one of the factors of
sub-culture development is geographical separation (Boisnier & Chatman, 2002). Maintenance,
flight, and UAS programs all conduct a portion of their training on satellite campuses.
There is one scale in which there was no statistical difference among the three programs: 
risk assessment. Questions in the risk assessment scale are introspective—measuring one’s own 
actions—while the other scales measure of the actions of the department. Taken together, this
reveals that, irrespective of the program, students behave and act in similar ways regarding safety
matters. However, the difference lies in how each program manages safety.
Conclusion
As discussed above, this study indicated that the safety culture in the department is 
perceived as positive by students in each program, but somewhat diverse results were obtained
between the groups. Although all students in the department have 13 credit hours of aviation 
coursework in common, that core is so small relative to the total number of aviation credit hours
required that different safety sub-cultures appear to develop within each concentration. The 
industry backgrounds of faculty in each program likely impact the development of these sub-
cultures. Additionally, the time since instigation of SMS concepts within programs appears to 
have a strong impact on student perception of safety culture. The flight program was the first in 
the department to embrace SMS concepts, with that effort now over a decade old. The
maintenance program SMS efforts began in earnest three years ago, and while progress is being 
made the perceptions of safety culture by students in this program currently lags slightly behind 
the flight and UAS program students. The UAS program is very different from the two other
programs. As a young program which was developed after the tenets of SMS were widely
understood in the industry, it was designed with these concepts built into every facet of
operation. In summary, the longevity of efforts to implement SMS, as well as the impact of the 
faculty members within each program, appears to be greater than the influence of the department
administration as a whole on student perception of safety culture.
Recommendations for Future Studies
Even though the response rate was relatively strong, it would be beneficial to repeat the















        
























approach but in the future, it is anticipated that a slightly modified instrument will be utilized 
annually to provide a longitudinal approach. Finally, repetition of the survey by other collegiate
aviation institutions is encouraged, as the further comparison of differences between programs
within the same university may lead to an understanding of how to assist various programs in 
improving their safety culture.
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